In the exercise of administrative functions, it is crucial that authorities vested with discretionary power act with due diligence and exercise independent judgment.
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When an authority fails to do so, it leads to “non-application of mind,” a legal deficiency that can render the action taken invalid.
The doctrine of non-application of mind prohibits the authority from acting arbitrarily, under dictation, or without considering the circumstances of each case.
Here, we discuss four prominent categories of non-application of mind under administrative law, illustrated through leading case precedents.
(i) Acting Under Dictation
An authority conferred with discretionary power must exercise that power autonomously and should not act under the dictation of another body or authority. When an authority does so, it abdicates its responsibility to act on its own judgment, thereby invalidating its decision.
This was established in Commr. of Police v Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16), where the Commissioner of Police, acting under the direction of the State government, revoked a cinema license. The court held that the Commissioner merely acted as a “transmitting agent” rather than exercising his own discretion, rendering the cancellation invalid.
A similar instance occurred in Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v Cane Commr. of Bihar (AIR 1970 SC 1896), where the Cane Commissioner, at the instruction of the Chief Minister, altered the reserved area for sugarcane, depriving the appellant company of 99 villages. The court quashed this action on the grounds that the Commissioner had abdicated his discretion by acting under the Chief Minister’s dictation.
It is pertinent to distinguish between “seeking advice” and “acting under dictation.” While the former is permissible as long as the authority independently exercises its discretion, acting purely on another’s directive amounts to a failure to exercise discretion.
In the Gordhandas case, the court held that the Commissioner’s initial action of issuing a license on the advisory committee’s recommendation was acceptable as “the will of the authority cannot be said to be overcome” by advice.
(ii) Imposing Fetters on Exercise of Discretion (Self-Restriction)
Authorities vested with discretionary power are expected to consider each case on its merits, without restricting their discretion by adopting a uniform policy applicable to all cases.
Self-imposed restrictions can result in fettering discretion, where the authority precludes itself from making decisions based on case-specific circumstances, contrary to legislative intent.
However, while general guidelines are permissible, they must not be inflexible or arbitrary.
This principle was notably expounded in SHRi Rama Sugar Industries Ltd. v State of A.P. (AIR 1974 SC 1745), where Section 21 of the A.P. Sugarcane (Regulation, Supply and Purchase) Act, 1961 empowered the State to exempt certain factories from tax.
The State adopted a policy granting exemption solely to co-operative sugar factories, leading to allegations of arbitrary policy-making that fettered administrative discretion.
The court held that while an authority may adopt general principles, it should retain the flexibility to make exceptions where individual circumstances so warrant.
Here, it was ruled that co-operative factories represented a distinct category deserving special treatment, based on relevant considerations like the state of the industry and the financial health of sugar factories.
Supporting this reasoning, British Oxygen v Minister of Technology [(1970) 3 All ER 165] in the UK also held that an authority with statutory discretion may adopt general policies, provided such policies remain legally relevant, are not arbitrary, and do not disable the authority from genuinely exercising discretion in individual cases.
The court ultimately upheld that the policy adopted in SHRi Rama Sugar Industries Ltd. was consistent with directive principles under Article 39(b) and (c), and therefore intra vires.
However, in his dissent, Justice Mathew argued that by restricting exemptions to co-operative factories, the government had predetermine the issue and unduly limited its discretion, making the policy ultra vires the Act.
(iii) Acting Mechanically and Without Due Care
An authority's discretionary action must be characterized by due care and consideration of relevant facts. A mechanical or casual approach signifies non-application of mind, rendering the decision legally infirm.
For example, in Emperor v Sibnath Banerji (AIR 1945 PC 156), the Privy Council held that the Home Secretary’s “personal satisfaction” was essential before issuing detention orders, thus emphasizing that the authority must conscientiously consider each case individually.
The Supreme Court further underscored this principle in Jaswant Singh v Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 124). Here, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, required government sanction to prosecute public servants for certain offenses.
The court held that this sanction was not a mere formality but necessitated that the authority “consider for itself” the evidence before deciding to sanction prosecution, a principle reiterated in Jagannath v State of Orissa (AIR 1966 SC 1140).
The court here declared that failure to consider all grounds in a detention order constitutes non-application of mind.
Another example is Nandlal Khodidas Barot v Bar Council of Gujarat (AIR 1981 SC 477), where the court criticized the Bar Council of Gujarat for referring a complaint to its Disciplinary Committee without preliminary investigation.
The council’s failure to determine whether a prima facie case of professional misconduct existed was deemed a neglect of its duty to exercise independent judgment.
(iv) Sub-Delegation of Power
Discretionary power vested in an authority should not be sub-delegated unless expressly permitted by statute. Unlawful sub-delegation occurs when an authority transfers its power to a subordinate without statutory sanction.
This was highlighted in Ganapati Singhji v State of Ajmer (AIR 1955 SC 188), where the Chief Commissioner unlawfully delegated his rule-making authority to a district magistrate. The court held this sub-delegation ultra vires, emphasizing that delegation of discretionary powers is impermissible unless explicitly authorized.
Concluding Remarks
Courts have consistently reinforced that administrative discretion must be safeguarded by policies, procedural safeguards, and guidelines to prevent arbitrary actions. The discretion, when exercised, must reflect adherence to statutory intent, and in cases involving sub-delegation, only operate within express statutory limits.
The judiciary has championed the “Rule of Law” principle, aiming to minimize arbitrariness in public power, thus upholding the legitimacy of administrative decisions.
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